When Public Sector Workers Unionize by Richard B. Freeman & Robert Valletta
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: When Public Sector Workers Unionize
Volume Author/Editor: Richard B. Freeman and Casey Ichniowski, eds.




Chapter Title: The Effects of Public Sector Labor Laws on Labor Market
Institutions and Outcomes
Chapter Author: Richard B. Freeman, Robert Valletta
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7904
Chapter pages in book: (p. 81 - 106)3  The Effects of Public Sector 
Labor Laws on Labor 
Market Institutions and 
Outcomes 
Richard B. Freeman and Robert G. Valletta 
In this paper  we  seek to determine the impact of labor laws on the 
collective bargaining status, wages, and employment of local govern- 
ment workers in the United States. We  use the new data on state public 
sector labor laws described in detail in appendix B in this volume and 
information from the Survey of Governments (SOG) and the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) to examine how differences and changes in 
public sector labor laws across states and among departments in cities 
affect collective bargaining, wages, and employment. 
The major finding is that state public sector laws are a prime deter- 
minant of the likelihood that municipal workers are covered by col- 
lective  bargaining  and  have  a  moderate  impact  on  the  wages  and 
employment of  public sector workers.  Comprehensive public sector 
labor laws raise the probability that workers are covered by collective 
bargaining contracts and, conditional on contracts, raise wages at the 
expense of  employment. In  addition, we  find  that  employment and 
wages in otherwise identical departments are higher in those with col- 
lective bargaining contracts, supporting the notion that public sector 
unions raise demand for labor as well as increase wages along given 
demand curves (Zax 1985; Freeman 1986b). 
Richard B. Freeman is professor of economics at Harvard University and the Director 
of Labor Studies at the  National  Bureau of Economic Research. Robert G. Valletta is 
a visiting assistant professor of economics at the University of California, Irvine. 
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3.1  The Cegal Environment for Public Sector Labor Relations 
The legal environment for public sector labor relations changed greatly 
in the United States between the 1950s and 1980s. In the 1950s most 
states had no explicit legislation covering public sector workers, and 
the few laws that did exist outlawed strikes or bargaining.  During the 
1960s a large number of states enacted labor laws that legalized col- 
lective bargaining for different groups of public employees. In the 1970s 
many states amended these laws to impose a duty to bargain on gov- 
ernments, and often followed this with compulsory interest arbitration 
or, in  some cases, right-to-strike provisions  designed to resolve  im- 
passes  in  bargaining  (see  appendix  B  and  Farber,  this  volume, 
chap. 5). Other states, by contrast, did not pass such legislation or in 
some instances enacted anti-union legislation. 
For the purpose of analyzing the effects of these different legal set- 
tings on public sector labor markets, we develop an index of the fa- 
vorableness of the state laws toward collective bargaining. Our index 
is based on provisions  regulating bargaining rights and dispute reso- 
lution.  In the area of bargaining  rights, we categorize laws into five 
groups: bargaining prohibited; no provision for bargaining; bargaining 
permitted; “meet  and confer”  or “present proposals”;  and duty to 
bargain.  The bargaining  prohibited  category gives public  employers 
recourse to the courts if workers form unions and try to negotiate over 
terms and conditions of employment. It is thus the least favorable legal 
environment for collective bargaining. The no provision for bargaining 
category is, however, close behind, as courts have often ruled that it 
also means that workers have no right to bargain collectively. The other 
legal categories treat collective bargaining more favorably: bargaining 
permitted allows bargaining but does not require employers to  negotiate 
with workers; “meet and confer” or “present proposals” ensures that 
employers listen to unions though it still allows them to make unilateral 
decisions; finally, duty-to-bargain provisions are the most favorable to 
collective bargaining because they require employers to  meet employee 
representatives at the bargaining table. 
In the area of dispute resolution we distinguish between: nonbinding 
mediation and fact-finding mechanisms that call for a neutral third party 
to seek to resolve  disputes without  empowering  them to fashion  a 
settlement; compulsory interest  arbitration, which  gives the neutral 
party the right to determine the terms of agreement, guaranteeing clo- 
sure of the process;’ and laws that permit strikes, which are the tra- 
ditional private sector mode for resolving bargaining impasses.2 
The bargaining rights and dispute resolution laws form a hierarchy 
from least to most favorable to collective bargaining. We  combine them 
into a single index for analysis. First, we divide state laws into the nine 83  The Effects of Public Sector Labor Laws 
categories shown in the first column of table 3.1, from bargaining pro- 
hibited at one extreme to strike permitted and compulsory arbitration 
at the other e~treme.~  As can be seen in  columns 2 and 3, there is a 
wide  distribution  of  municipalities across the nine categories in  the 
years for which we have observations. For reasons of  parsimony we 
further summarize  the  laws with a single monotonic  index  of  their 
favorableness to collective bargaining. Specifically, we associate with 
each legal environment in a city department a value from 9 (= most 
favorable to collective bargaining) to  1  (= least favorable); compute 
the mean and standard deviation of these numeric values across cities; 
and form a standardized Z score as our index measure. The advantage 
of standardizing categories in this way is that it allows us to simplify 
presentation of  empirical results. The virtue of  the Z  score is that it 
gives more extreme values to categories that differ greatly from the 
mean in their rating and that are relatively rare. None of our results 
hinge, of course, on this particular way of summarizing the legal codes. 
Column 4 of  table 3.1 records the Z-score values that we associate 
with each law category given the distribution of municipal departments 
in  column 2. To  illustrate  how  to interpret  the  scores consider the 
movement  from no  provision  (Z  = -  1.19) to duty  to bargain  with 
required  mediation  or  fact-finding  (Z = 0.58)  or  to  arbitration 
(Z = 1.29),-both  common changes in state law between the 1960s and 
Table 3.1  Distsribution of  Survey of Governments (SOG) and Current Population 
Survey (CPS) Observations Across Legal Categories,  by Collective 
Bargaining Coverage 
% of Observation in Category 
2-Score 
Legal Category  SOG  CPS  Value 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1.  Duty to bargain and required arbitration 
2.  Duty to bargain and strikes permitted 
3.  Duty to bargain and required fact- 
finding or mediation 
4.  Duty to bargain 
5. Conferral rights and required fact- 
finding or mediation 
6. Right to meet and confer or present 
proposals 
7.  Bargaining permitted 
8.  No provision for bargaining 
9.  Bargaining prohibited 


























-  .48 
-  .83 
-1.19 
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1970s. The first change is a  1.77 standard deviation improvement in 
the legal environment  for collective bargaining; the second corresponds 
to a 2.48 standard deviation improvement. Given the frequency of these 
changes in the laws we will use a two standard deviation change in the 
legal index to evaluate the quantitative impact of legal changes on labor 
market outcomes. 
3.1.1 
There are two ways in  which  laws regarding  collective bargaining 
can affect  economic outcomes.  First, they  can affect outcomes by 
encouraging collective bargaining (Saltzman  1985; this volume, chap. 
2; Ichniowski, this volume, chap. 1) and thus bear indirect responsibility 
for the bargaining-induced  increases in  wages  (Lewis, this  volume, 
chap. 6;  Freeman 1986b) and employment (Zax 1985; Freeman 1986b). 
Second, given collective contracts, the laws can also affect outcomes 
directly by altering the results of bargaining and the decisions of non- 
union managements.  This can occur by changing union power at bar- 
gaining tables and by creating greater or lesser threat effects on nonunion 
employers to match union wage gains. 
To analyze the effects of public sector laws on outcomes we develop 
a model of union behavior in  which the legal environment alters the 
resources the union expends to raise wages at the bargaining table. The 
model consists of 
i) A labor demand curve that the public sector union can shift through 
lobbying  for greater  public  spending  or  other non-bargaining-table 
activity: 
(1)  E= -  -qW  + X  + bRS, 
where E = In employment; W = In wages; q = elasticity of labor de- 
mand; X  = level  of demand for labor; RS  = resources devoted by 
union to lobbying or political activity to raise the demand for public 
services produced by union members. We  assume for simplicity that 
this activity has a constant proportional effect on demand; 
ii) A union objective function that depends on wages and employment: 
(2)  U = U(W,E); 
to the resources devoted to bargaining (RB): 
(3)  W  = W(RB,  L, S), 
where L  = the legal environment for collective bargaining, S = labor 
supply factors, and RB + RS = R,  the total amount of resources avail- 
able to the union. 
Modelling Effects of the Legal Environment 
iii) A function relating wages obtained through collective bargaining 85  The Effects of Public Sector Labor Laws 
To maximize utility the union divides its resources between bargain- 
ing and lobbyinglpolitical activity subject to (1) and (3) and the resource 
constraint. This yields the equilibrium condition that the union divide 
it resources to equate the marginal rate of substitution in utility to the 
relevant marginal opportunity costs: 
(4)  UwlUe = q + blW‘, 
where Uw  and Ue are the partial derivatives of the utility function with 
respect to wages and employment. 
How does a more favorable labor law affect wage and employment 
outcomes in this model? If, as seems plausible, a legal environment 
favorable to collective bargaining increases the relative effectiveness 
of resources spent on bargaining as opposed to those spent on raising 
demand through the political process, W’  will be greater at any given 
level of  RB. Therefore, q + blW’ will be smaller, inducing the union 
to shift resources to bargaining and thus to increase wages at the ex- 
pense of employment. The law acts as if it reduced the elasticity of 
demand for labor. Since the actual elasticity remains unchanged, this 
has the consequence of lowering employment. 
3.1.2  Reduced Form Estimating Equations 
Rather than seeking to estimate a full-scale union maximizing model, 
we use the model in (1)-(4)  as the framework for interpreting reduced- 
form  employment and  wage  equations. The simplest  reduced-form 
equations that we estimate have the log-linear form: 
(5)  W = aX + CL + dS 
(6)  E  = a’X  + c‘L + d’S 
In some calculations we also include a dummy variable for collective 
bargaining c~verage.~  With this variable in the regressions, the coef- 
ficients on the legal index reflect the direct effects of  the laws on out- 
comes as opposed to the “full”  effects in (5)  and (6). 
3.2  Empirical Analysis 
This section presents estimates of what the legal environment does 
to  contract coverage, wages, and employment using data from the SOG 
for 1977-80  and data from the annual 1984 CPS for six local sector 
departments: police; fire fighters; sanitation other than sewerage; streets 
and highways; finance and general control; and teachers. 
The  SOG  contains data on  employment,  wages,  government  fi- 
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in the United  States. To determine whether a city department in  the 
SOG has a collective bargaining contract, we made use of two pieces 
of information: the total number of contracts in the municipality and 
the number of bargaining units. When the number of contracts equals 
or exceeds the number of  bargaining units we  specify that each de- 
partment with a bargaining unit had a collective agreement.5 When the 
SOG  indicates that a city had no contracts, no bargaining units, and 
no collective bargaining policy, we infer that no departments have a 
collective agreement. These two rules enable us to specify the collective 
bargaining status of  departments in  86 percent of the SOG sample. 
Departments in cities in which the data did not fit these rules have an 
ambiguous bargaining status, so we deleted them from the sample. By 
our procedure 21  percent of the sample of  department-year observa- 
tions were covered by collective bargaining. Finally, to take account 
of the diverse factors beyond  state laws that affect municipal labor 
markets we supplemented the SOG data with detailed information on 
the economic and demographic characteristics of  the populations of 
1,153 U.S. cities from Summary Tape Files 1 and 3 of the 1980 Census 
of Population.6 
The CPS  May  files contain  information  on  the  demographic  and 
economic position of  individual workers and whether they are union 
members or covered by collective bargaining contracts. In 1984 the file 
contained this information for the outgoing rotation group from each 
of the twelve monthly surveys of the year, which we used as our sample. 
A problem with the CPS is that it does not allow for the possibility 
that some public sector workers are union members but not covered 
by  contracts, forcing us-like  other researchers-to  assume that all 
union members are covered. Because the CPS data are for individuals, 
moreover, they give greater weight to larger cities and departments 
than does the SOG. Since larger cities are more likely to be covered 
by collective contracts, the mean of the coverage variable in the CPS 
is considerably higher than the mean for the same occupational group 
in the SOG (see table 3.2). 
3.2.1 
The first issue to investigate is whether public sector laws favorable 
to collective bargaining are associated with greater contract coverage. 
If they are not, we would not expect them to have any impact on wages 
or employment. 
To  determine the effect of  laws on contract status, we  estimated 
linear probability equations linking a 0- 1 contract coverage variable to 
our legal index and diverse controls for various public employee group- 
ings in  the CPS and SOG.’  In the CPS calculations our dependent 
variable takes on the value one if  the worker is a union member or 
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Table 3.2  Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors (in parentheses) for the 
Effect of Laws on Collective Bargaining Coverage (CPS and SOG data) 
~~ 
Panel A: CPS Cross-Section (1984p 
State Employees  Teachers  Police and Fire  Other Local 
Legal index  .I3  .I0  .I0  .I1 
(.OW  (.010)  (.020)  (308) 
Mean of 0-1 
coverage variable  .39  .74  .75  .38 
R2  .23  .20  .25  .20 
Number of  observations  5,340  3,591  74  1  7,523 
Panel B: SOG Cross-Section (pooled sample, 1977-80)b 
Streets and  Finance and 
Police  Fire  Sanitation  Highways  Control 
Legal index  .21  .I9  ,014  ,073  ,062 
Mean of 0-1 
coverage variable  .40  .39  ,052  .I3  ,073 
R2  .38  .32  ,069  .I7  .12 
Number of observations  3,904  3,505  3,247  3,906  3,957 
(.008)  (.009)  (.005)  (.007)  (.006) 
“Other control variables are: dummy variables for educational attainment, age, region, female, 
black, city  size; fire fighters in the  police  and fire  regression; and alternative wages in  the 
individual’s SMSA. 
bother control variables are: population (and interactions with  three city-size dummies), per 
capita income, median household income, median property values, percent of population with 
income below 75% of poverty level, percent black, percent high school graduates, percent with 
1 to 3 years college, percent college graduates, percent attended graduate school, region dum- 
mies, and year dummies. 
covered by a collective contract. In the SOG calculations it takes the 
value one if the city department has a collective contract according to 
the procedure described earlier. 
Panels A and B of table 3.2 summarize the results of these calcula- 
tions for the two data sets. While there are differences in the magnitudes 
of  the estimated coefficients on the legal index, both  panels tell the 
same story: they show a significant positive relation between the favor- 
ableness of  the public  sector labor law to collective  bargaining and 
contract coverage. In the CPS calculations the estimated coefficients 
on the legal index range from .10 to .13, implying that a two standard 
deviation improvement in  the laws (roughly from no laws to duty to 
bargain or arbitration) would increase the probability of  having a col- 
lective contract by 20 to 26 percentage points. In the SOG calculations 
the estimated coefficients vary more widely, from .19 and .21 for police 
and fire fighters to .07 and .06 for streets and highways, and finance 
and control, to a bare  .01  in  sanitation. With the  sole exception of 88  Richard B. FreemadRobert G. Valletta 
sanitation, the estimated effects are quantitatively large relative to the 
mean coverage. Finally, if the SOG data are pooled into a single sample 
and dummy variables added for departments, the average effect of the 
legal index is .12 (column  I  of table 3.3), which is on the same order 
as the effects found in the CPS data. 
The strong relation between laws and the presence of collective con- 
tracts that underlies these regressions  is  shown in  figure 3.1, which 
reports the percentage of city departments or workers in city depart- 
ments covered by contracts in different legal  settings. The coverage 
proportions range  from  two-thirds  of  city  departments in  the most 
favorable category  to virtually zero in  the least favorable,  and from 
three-fourths of  workers in  city  departments in  the most  favorable 
category to 19 percent in the least favorable category. Because, as we 
noted earlier, the CPS data code all workers who are members of unions 
or associations as having contracts, the  19 percent is undoubtedly  a 
substantial overestimate of the true proportion in that category. The 
data bias works to minimize the relation between the laws and coverage, 
making the observed patterns even more striking. 
3.2.2  Probing the Law-Collective  Bargaining Relation 
Should the positive relation between the favorableness of public sec- 
tor labor law and collective bargaining  shown in table 3.2 and figure 
3.1 be interpreted as causal, or might it be due to the effect of some 
omitted variables? One possible explanation of the results is that fa- 
vorable  laws  encourage unionization,  which  leads to collective bar- 
gaining,  but beyond  stimulating  workers to organize,  the laws then 
have no further impact. If  this were the case, we would  expect the 
estimated coefficient on the laws to disappear if we controlled for union 
membership in the regressions.  Accordingly, we added another labor 
relations variable from the SOG to our regressions: the percentage of 
full-time workers who are members of a union or  employee association. 
As can be seen by comparing columns 1 and 2 of table 3.3, addition 
of  this  variable  reduces the estimated impact of the legal  index  on 
coverage from .12 to .07. Still, .07 represents a substantial and statis- 
tically  significant effect of a change in  the legal index on coverage, 
which implies that even where union  and association membership is 
high,  a strong bargaining  law serves to legitimize the collective bar- 
gaining process. Put differently, worker support for unionism is not 
enough to guarantee collective bargaining. 
A  second noncausal  interpretation is that the positive relation be- 
tween public sector labor laws and collective bargaining results from 
spurious correlation  due to the omission  of a city- or state-specific 
variable (call it pro-union sentiment) that is correlated with both the 
laws and bargaining.  To  test this explanation  we controlled  for city Percent  in  Category 
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Fig. 3.1  I  1  1 
4  5  6  7  8  9 
Legal  Category 
Percent in category of government departments that are cov- 
ered by  collective bargaining  (SOG data) (top); percent in 
category of workers that are covered by collective bargaining 
(CPS data) (bottom). 
Legal categories are represented by numbers as follows: 
1  = Duty to bargain and Required arbitration 
2 = Duty to bargain and Strikes permitted 
3 = Duty to bargain and Required fact-finding or mediation 
4 = Duty to bargain 
5 = Conferral rights and Required fact-finding or mediation 
6 = Right to Meet and confer or Present proposals 
7 = Bargaining permitted 
8 = No provision for bargaining 
9 = Bargaining prohibited 90  Richard B. FreemadRobert G.  Valletta 
Table 3.3  Regression Coefficients and Standard ErrorsP for the Effect of 
Laws on Collective Bargaining Coverage, Controlling for Percent 
Organized in the Department (SOG data) 
Pooled, 1977-80  Within City Analysish 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Legal index 
Percent union members 
Department dummies 
City dummies 
Mean of 0-1 
R* 
































Note: Other control variables are: population (and interactions with three city-size dum- 
mies), per capita income, median household income, median property values, percent 
of  population with  income below  75%  of  poverty  level, percent  black, percent  high 
school graduates, percent with  I  to 3 years college, percent college graduates, percent 
attended graduate school, region dummies, and year dummies. 
aStandard errors in parentheses. 
bStandard errors in columns (3)  and (4)  are corrected to adjust for inclusion  of  city- 
specific control variables.  In addition, the models in columns (3) and (4) include inter- 
actions between the demographic controls and the department dummy variables. 
effects that influence all occupations by taking dependent and inde- 
pendent variables as deviations from city means, which is equivalent 
to including city dummy variables in the regressions. In these calcu- 
lations we also included interactions between department dummy vari- 
ables  and  measured  city  characteristics  to allow  measured  control 
variables to affect different departments differently. 
The results of  our calculations, given in  columns 3 and 4 of table 
3.3, show that controlling for city effects has little impact on the es- 
timated coefficient on the legal index, and thus the relation between 
laws and bargaining cannot be attributed to an omitted city factor. With 
no control for the percent organized, the coefficient on the legal index 
in  the within-city analysis is comparable to that in the pooled regres- 
sion, whereas after controlling for the percent organized, it is actually 
larger. Employee groups governed by  more favorable collective bar- 
gaining laws are more likely to win  contracts than employee groups 
governed by less favorable laws in the same city. We  conclude that the 
relation between the legal environment and contract coverage is more 
likely to reflect causal factors than to be a spurious correlation due to 
omitted variable bias. 91  The Effects of  Public Sector Labor Laws 
3.2.3  The Relation of Laws to Wages and Employment 
What about the impact of the laws on market outcomes? Do wages 
and employment differ in departments operating under different col- 
lective bargaining  laws? To answer these questions we estimated re- 
duced-form equations relating wages to the legal environment in the 
CPS (table 3.4) and relating wages and employment to the legal envi- 
ronment  in  the SOG  (table  3.5). In  both  cases we  estimated three 
regressions for each occupation group.  The first  regression  includes 
the legal index and control variables, but excludes a measure of whether 
workers are covered by collective bargaining.  The coefficient on the 
legal index thus reflects the direct and indirect effects of the laws as 
described earlier. 
The second regression in each set includes collective bargaining cov- 
erage as an additional independent variable.  Since coverage is fixed, 
the coefficient on the legal index variable measures the direct effect of 
the laws on outcomes. While, as we have seen in figure 3.1, the legal 
environment and  contract coverage  are closely  connected, there is 
sufficient variation in the data to allow us to disentangle the effects of 
the two variables. 
The third regression in each set adds a coverage-legal  index inter- 
action term to allow for the possibility that the indirect effect of laws 
is different for workers who gain a contract and those who do not. 
Each regression also includes the full set of controls described in the 
table notes. The CPS regressions are limited to  wage equations because 
data on individuals do not  permit  analysis  of  the effect  of  laws on 
departmental employment. 
Turning to the estimates, the first regressions for each group in table 
3.4 show that the legal environment has a statistically significant but 
moderate impact on In  hourly earnings for all groups. The regression 
coefficients on the legal index are on the order of .03, which translate 
into roughly  6 percent  earnings differentials between states with  no 
.laws and those with favorable laws, given the approximately two stan- 
dard deviation difference between the categories. The second regres- 
sions in  the table  show that  much  of this is due to the intervening 
coverage variable: the coefficients on the legal index variable are roughly 
halved  in each case, while collective bargaining is estimated to raise 
wages by .12 to .15. This is consistent with Lewis’s generalization that 
collective bargaining has sizeable impacts on wages at the local level 
(Lewis, this volume, chap. 6). Still, the legal index remains significant 
in all cases, with coefficients that suggest direct effects on earnings of 
3 to 4 percent.  Finally, the coefficients for the interaction terms in the 
third  regressions  in  the table range from insignificantly  negative  to 
significantly positive, and thus give no indication of a differential effect 
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Table 3.4  Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors* for the Effect of  the 
Legal Environment and Collective Bargaining Coverage on 
Ln(Hourly Wage) (CPS, 1984) 
Group 
Legal  Coverage-Legal 
Index  Coverage  Interaction  R2  N 
Teachers 










-  ,009 
(.015) 
































-  .36 
-  .37 
.033  .37 
(.033) 
-  .24 
-  .25 
.036  .25 
c.016) 
-  .30 
-  .33 
- ,033  .33 
(.028) 
-  .35 
-  .37 
,015  .37 






359  1 
74  1 
74  1 




Note: Other control variables  are: dummy  variables for educational  attainment, age, 
region, female, black,  city  size; fire fighters in the police and fire regressions;  and al- 
ternative wages in the individual’s SMSA. 
5tandard errors in parentheses. 
Panel A of table 3.5 reports the results of estimating the effect of 
the legal index on wages for city departments in the SOG data, pooled 
across departments and years. The estimated impact of the index is 
.04,  which is of comparable magnitude to the estimate in the CPS data. 
The estimated impact of collective bargaining coverage is, however, 
noticeably smaller-.06  versus a range from .I2  to .15-and  its addition 
to the equation has a more modest impact in reducing the coefficient 
on the legal index. As in the CPS calculations, the interaction term is 
negligible, suggesting that state labor laws have a similar impact on the 
wages of workers with and without collective contracts. 
Panel  B  of  table  3.5 turns from the effect of  laws and collective 
bargaining on wages to their effect on employment. In these calcula- 
tions the dependent variable is the log of full-time departmental em- 93  The Effects of  Public Sector Labor Laws 
Table 3.5  Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors.  for the Effects of the 
Legal Environment and Collective Bargaining Coverage on Wages 
and Employment (SOG pooled cross-section date, 1977-80 
(n = 18,382)) 
Panel A: Ln (Monthly Salary per Full-Time Employee in Department) 
Legal index  ,039  ,032  ,032 
(.002)  (.002)  (.002) 
Coverage  -  .058  .057 
(.004)  (.004) 
-  .002 
(.ow) 
Legal-coverage interaction  - 
R2  .64  .65  .65 
Panel B: Ln (Number of  Full-Time Employees in  Department) 
Legal index  -  ,056  -  ,082  -  .099 
(  ,006)  (.006)  (.007) 
(.014)  (.OI5) 
Legal-coverage interaction  -  -  .076 
(.014) 
R2  .70  .71  .71 
Coverage  -  .24  .21 
Note: Other control variables are: population (and interactions with three city-size dum- 
mies), per capita income, median household income, median property values, percent 
of  population  with  income below  75% of  poverty  level,  percent black, percent  high 
school graduates, percent with  1 to 3 years college, percent college graduates, percent 
attended graduate school, region dummies, year dummies, and department dummies. 
Wandard errors in parentheses. 
ployment,8 while the independent variables are the same as in the pay 
regressions.  Here we obtain a surprising result: the estimated coeffi- 
cient on the legal index is substantial and negative, implying that em- 
ployment  is  smaller  when  laws  are  more  favorable  to  collective 
bargaining, whereas the effect of collective bargaining on employment 
is significantly positive, consistent with Zax (1985). 
Why do strong labor laws, which affect wages in the same direction 
as collective bargaining contracts, have the opposite effect on employ- 
ment? The positive coefficient on the interaction of collective bargain- 
ing coverage and legal enactment in the interaction regression offers 
one possible answer, for it indicates that the negative relation between 
the laws and employment occurs largely among city departments that 
do not sign contracts. If a favorable legal environment induces nonunion 
cities to raise wages to avoid unionization but does not create pressures 
for additional government services, one would expect the higher wages 
to reduce employment. Similarly, if  favorable laws raise union power 
more at the bargaining table than in the political or lobbying arena, as 94  Richard B. FreemadRobert G. Valletta 
in our model of union behavior, they will induce greater wage increases 
at the expense of employment under collective bargaining. Put differ- 
ently, under these interpretations the legal index will measure  move- 
ments along a demand curve to a greater extent than shifts in  labor 
demand due to union (or nonunion worker) political activity, and thus 
have negative or nonpositive effects on employment. Since the wage 
effects of the legal environment are estimated to be about the same in 
cities with and without contracts, however, this explanation  requires 
the following: either the elasticity of labor demand must be greater in 
noncovered city departments (as in the private  sector, Freeman and 
Medoff 1981; Allen  1983), or more favorable legal environments must 
enhance the ability of unions to shift out the demand curve, reducing 
the negative impact of higher wages on employment. 
The second possible interpretation of the employment results is that 
they are spurious, due to an incomplete specification of the determi- 
nants of public sector employment. Perhaps employment is lower in 
noncovered city departments because these cities have an especially 
low demand for public services, keeping employment low and limiting 
the power of unions to obtain contracts. 
3.2.4  Probing the Relation of Laws to Wages and Employment 
To  probe the estimated impact of laws on pay and to examine the 
possible causes of the inverse relation between the laws and employ- 
ment, we performed two additional calculations designed to eliminate 
the potential impact of omitted city variables on the regressions. First, 
we  added  city dummy  variables  to the SOG wage  and employment 
 regression^,^ so that the estimated coefficients on the legal index and 
collective bargaining reflect the within-city effect of differences in the 
laws and outcomes among departments. Second, we made use of the 
1972 SOG data file to perform a longitudinal analysis of the same city 
departments over time as state public sector labor laws changed. 
Table 3.6 presents the results  of our within-city  calculations. The 
dependent variable in panel A is the difference between the log of pay 
in a department and the average pay in a city for all five departments 
in the sample. The dependent variable in panel  B is the difference in 
the log of employment in a department and the average employment 
in the city for all departments. In each panel the independent variables 
also relate to differences between the variable for a department and 
the city average.  In  addition, we allow for likely  differences  in  the 
effects of city characteristics on departments by including interaction 
terms between department dummy variables and those characteristics. 
Controlling for city effects in the wage equation greatly reduces the 
coefficients  on the legal  index  and  on collective  bargaining; in  the 95  The Effects of Public Sector Labor  Laws 
Table 3.6  Regression Coefficients and Standard Errorss for the Effect of the 
Legal Environment and Collective Bargaining Coverage on Wages 
and Employment  Controlling for City-Specific Effects (SOG 
pooled cross-section data for 1977-80  (n = 13,960)) 






.008  ,008 
(.004)  (.004) 
.008  ,008 
(.004)  ( ,004) 
-  -  ,003 
(.012) 
Panel B:  Ln (Number of Full-Time Employees in Department) 
Legal index  ,030  .004  ,002 
(.020)  (.020)  (.020) 
Coverage  -  .24  .24 
(.019)  (.019) 
Legal-coverage interaction  -  -  ,019 
(.047) 
Note: Other control variables are: population (and interactions with three city-size dum- 
mies), per capita income, median  household income, median  property values, percent 
of  population with  income below  75%  of  poverty  level, percent  black, percent  high 
school graduates, percent with  1 to 3 years college, percent college graduates, percent 
attended graduate school, region dummies, year dummies, department dummies, and 
interactions between the city characteristic variables and four department dummies. 
8Standard  errors in  parentheses, corrected  for inclusion  of  controls for city-specific 
effects. 
employment equation it reverses the sign on the coefficient on the legal 
index but has little impact on the estimated  effect of  collective bar- 
gaining  compared  to our earlier  cross-section results.  While  these 
changes may be taken as evidence of a significant omitted city-factor 
bias in the cross-section  regressions, they also can be interpreted as 
reflecting spillover effects across departments within cities that greatly 
reduce the estimated impact of the laws and of collective bargaining in 
within-city comparisons. This interpretation is consistent with the Zax 
and Ichniowski findings of substantial within-city  spillovers of wages 
(this volume, chap. 12). 
Table 3.7 presents the results of  our longitudinal analysis from 1972 
to  1980.  Because the  SOG  did  not  collect  good  data on collective 
bargaining coverage for 1972 our analysis is limited to changes in the 
legal index over the period.  In this eight-year interval approximately 
40 percent of our sample changed legal categories, with most of the 
changes taking the form of movements from  simple duty-to-bargain 96  Richard B. FreemadRobert G.  Valletta 
provisions to  arbitration, and from meet-and-confer provisions to duty- 
to-bargain statutes. The regressions we use for our analysis are derived 
from the following two-equation system: 
(7)  YI = a + bL1 + CX + AD  + uI 
(8)  Yo = a’ + bLo + c’X  + D + uo 
Here,  Y  is  the dependent variable,  wages  or employment; D is an 
omitted city-department variable that is expected to bias cross-section 
regressions;  u1  and u,  are independent disturbances; L and X are defined 
as in eq. (1) and (3). The subscript 1 relates to 1980 and the subscript 
0 relates to 1972. This specification imposes similar coefficients on the 
legal index in the two periods but allows coefficients on the omitted 
city-department  factor and on the control variables (which are available 
only for one time period and thus have no time subscript)  to differ over 
time. Solving for D in (8) and substituting in (7) yields our estimating 
equation: 
(9)  AY  = a - Xa‘  + bL, - AbL,  + (c - Xc’)X 
+ (A - 1)  Yo  +  (~1  - Au~) 
in which the omitted city-department factor has been eliminated. 
Table  3.7 contains estimates of equation (9) for pay  and employ- 
ment.Io Panel A gives the coefficients when the dependent variable is 
the change  in  pay.  The regression  shows that the  1980 legal  index 
variable has a positive impact on wages of  .024, which  is somewhat 
smaller than the .039 obtained in the comparable table 3.5 regression 
but still non-negligible and statistically significant. If the specification 
is correct, the coefficient on the 1972 legal index should be opposite 
in sign to that on the 1980 legal index, and roughly equal in magnitude 
to the coefficient on the 1980 index multiplied by one plus the coefficient 
on the lagged wage term, as is roughly the case. Dividing the depart- 
ments between those that were and were not  covered by  collective 
contracts in  1980 shows similar results. 
Panel B of  the table gives the coefficients when the change in em- 
ployment is the dependent variable. Here, we find moderate negative 
effects for the 1980 legal index in all the regressions, with the separate 
regressions  for city departments by  contract status showing greater 
negative effects to laws without contracts, consistent with the cross- 
section results given in table 3.5. Note, however, that the 1972 legal 
index has the same, rather than the opposite, signed impact on em- 
ployment, suggesting that a more complex model with lagged employ- 
ment responses is needed to capture the variation in the data. If  one 
assumes that the negative coefficient on the lagged legal index reflects 97  The Effects of Public  Sector Labor Laws 
Table 3.7  Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors.  for the Effects of the 
Legal Environment and Collective Bargaining Coverage on Wages 
and Employment (Longitudinal model controlling for department- 
specific effects; SOG data for changes between 1972 and 1980) 
Panel A: ALn(Monthly Salary per Full-Time Employee in  Department) 
Coveredh 
Full Sample  Departments 
(N = 5281)  (N  =  1044) 
Legal index 1980  .024  ,028 
( ,004)  (.008) 
Legal index 1972  -  ,002  ,002 
(.005)  (.008) 
(.012)  (.026) 
Ln( 1972 wages)  -  .66  -  .62 
Not Covered 
Departments 
(N = 3474) 
.02  I 
(.005) 
-  ,013 
(.a371 
(.015) 
-  .69 
Panel B: ALn(Number of Full-Time Employees in Department) 
Covered 
Full Sample  Departments 
(N = 5281)  (N =  1044) 
Not Covered 
Departments 
(N = 3474) 
Legal index 1980  -  ,037  -  .029 
(.010)  (.016) 
(.013)  (.017) 
(.010)  (.022) 
Legal index 1972  -  .010  -  .Ol6 
Ln( 1972 employment)  -  .31  -  .40 




-  ,029 
p.31 
Nofe:  Other control variables are: population (and interactions with three city-size dum- 
mies), per capta income, median household income, median property values, percent of 
population with income below 75% of  poverty level, percent black, percent high school 
graduates, percent with  1 to 3 years college, percent college graduates, percent attended 
graduate school, region dummies, and department dummies. 
"Standard errors in parentheses. 
bRefers to departments covered by contract in 1980; coverage data for 1972 are unavailable. 
time  delays, one would  add  the coefficients on the two legal  index 
variables to get a full impact of the legal environment. 
3.2.5  Arbitration versus Permitting Strikes 
The analysis thus far has focused on the relation between the index 
of the legal environment for collective bargaining and economic out- 
comes. In states that have enacted duty-to-bargain legislation, the policy- 
relevant  question relates to the more specific issue of  the impact of 
alternative dispute resolution laws on outcomes; specifically, on whether 
compulsory arbitration or strike-permitted  laws raise pay. What does 98  Richard B. FreemadRobert G. Valletta 
our data tell  us about the effects of these provisions  on wages and 
employment in duty-to-bargain states? 
To answer this question we estimated wage and employment equa- 
tions analogous to those given earlier on a sample of departments with 
duty-to-bargain or stronger bargaining laws in 1980, with dummy vari- 
ables for arbitration or strike-permitted legislation replacing our legal 
index. The results of these calculations are summarized in table 3.8 in 
terms of the coefficients on the key legal category dummy variables. 
Columns  1 and 2 record the results when the dependent variable is In 
wages, while columns 3 and 4 record the results when it is In employ- 
ment. The principal  finding in the table is the marked difference be- 
tween the estimated impact of arbitration and strike-permitted laws. In 
the cross-section analysis, departments covered by compulsory arbi- 
tration laws appear to have somewhat lower wages than other depart- 
Table 3.8  Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors (in parentheses) for the 
Effect of Arbitration and Strike-Permitted Laws on Wages and 
Employment (SOG cross-section [pooled, 1977-801 and longitudinal data 
11980-19721,  Duty-to-bargain sample') 
Dependent Variable 
In Wages  In  Employment 
Cross Section  Longitudinal  Cross Section  Longitudinal 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Arbitration  1980 
Strikes permitted 
Arbitration  1972 
Strikes permitted 
In  Wages 1972 
~  ,023 
(.005) 
(.007) 
1980  .014 
- 
- 












-  .06l 
-  .69 
-  ,034 















~  ,044 
-  .21 
- 
- 
-  .26  In Employment 1972  -  -  - 
-  -  (.013)  - 
Sample size  I 1,396  2,922  1 1,396  2,922 
Nore: Other variables controlled for in each regression are: population (and interactions with 
three city-size dummies), per capita income, median household income, median property values, 
percent of population with  income below  75% of poverty level, percent black, percent high 
school graduates, percent with  I  to 3 years college, percent college graduates, percent attended 
graduate school, region dummies, and department dummies. Also, the cross-section regressions 
include year dummies. 
'The sample only includes departments in legal categories 1-4  (see table 3.1) in  1980. 
*Refers  only to departments covered by a collective bargaining contract in 1980. Coverage data 
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ments. In the longitudinal analysis, departments covered by compulsory 
arbitration in 1980 have essentially the same pay as  other departments, 
while those that were also covered by arbitration in 1972 are estimated 
to have slightly lower pay than other departments. At the least these 
calculations reject the notion that arbitration laws create pressures for 
higher pay in covered  jurisdictions-a  result consistent with other find- 
ings that compare collectively  bargained  and arbitrated settlements 
(Ashenfelter and Bloom  1984; studies cited  in  Freeman  1986b). By 
contrast, both the cross-section and longitudinal analyses suggest that 
pay is modestly higher under strike-permitted  laws:  in column 1 the 
coefficient on strike-permitted laws for 1980 is .014; in column 2 strike 
permitted in  1980 has a positive effect on In  pay, whereas strike per- 
mitted in  1972 has a negative effect, as expected given the difference 
equation. As for employment, the evidence is more mixed: the cross- 
section and longitudinal calculations show modest negative effects for 
arbitration laws on employment, but show drastically different effects 
of  strike-permitted  laws-negative  in  the cross-section  analysis  and 
positive in the longitudinal analysis-that  suggest the need  for more 
detailed investigation. Setting aside the employment results as ambig- 
uous, the conclusion  to be  drawn from table 3.8  is that arbitration 
laws have effectively no impact on pay, while strike-permitted laws 
raise pay. 
3.2.6  CPS versus SOG Results on Contracts 
While it was not the purpose of this study to estimate the impact of 
union  contracts on wages, the surprising difference in the estimated 
contract effect between the CPS data set in table 3.4-coefficients  on 
coverage of .15-compared  to those in the SOG data set-coefficients 
on coverage of  .054eserves further attention. What  might explain 
the difference?  Does collective bargaining  in  the local  public  sector 
raise pay as much as is suggested by the CPS or as little as suggested 
by the SOG? 
We have explored several possible reasons for the divergent estimates 
of  the collective  bargaining  effect  between the two data sets.  One 
possibility is that the CPS data give greater weight to large cities than 
the SOG data and that coverage effects vary by size of city. To  assess 
this we re-estimated  the table  3.5  wage  equation weighting  the de- 
partment observations by city size. The estimated coverage coefficients 
decreased rather than increased, which indicates that union effects are 
larger for smaller cities, contrary to our hypothesis."  A second pos- 
sibility is that the estimated coefficients differ because the data sets 
cover different occupations. To  see if this is the case, we estimated 
our cross-section  wage equation in the SOG for the two occupations 
found in both data sets, police and fire, and other local employees,'2 100  Richard B. FreemadRobert G. Valletta 
and obtained estimates of coverage effects of .06 and .05, respectively, 
well below the CPS-based estimates in table 3.4. A third possibility is 
that the results differ because the SOG sample covers the years 1977- 
80, whereas the CPS sample covers  1984. To  test this possibility we 
estimated the impact of coverage on wages using the May 1980 CPS. 
Because this file has fewer observations than the 1984 annual file, we 
estimated coverage effects for occupations with relatively large num- 
bers of persons: teachers, state employees, and other local employees. 
The 1980 regression coefficients on coverage exceed the  1984 coeffi- 
cients for the same groups, rejecting this explanation.I3 In sum, we are 
unable to account for the difference in estimated coverage effects be- 
tween the two data sets. Whatever the explanation, however, the mes- 
sage is clear: given the estimated divergence in estimates one should 
look at both in assessing the impact of collective bargaining on wages 
and be careful not to mix them in evaluating changes in union wage 
effects over time.I4 
3.3  Conclusion 
This study has found that state labor laws have significant effects on 
collective bargaining and wage and employment outcomes in the public 
sector. While there are ambiguities in interpreting some of the empirical 
relations in the data, the evidence tends to support the following four 
claims: 
1. State laws are a major determinant of whether workers obtain col- 
lective bargaining contracts, even after controlling for their union 
status and for unmeasured city-specific factors. 
2. Laws favorable to collective bargaining produce higher wages by 
encouraging bargaining relations and by creating an environment in 
which covered and noncovered workers make wage gains. More 
favorable laws are, however,  associated with lower employment, 
primarily  in  departments lacking collective  bargaining contracts, 
which we attribute to the departments paying higher wages to avoid 
unionization. 
3. Collective bargaining for local government workers is associated 
with higher wages and greater employment. The latter is consistent 
with models of  public sector unionism that stress the lobbying and 
political activities of unions designed to increase demand for public 
services produced by members. 
4.  Within cities  wage and employment  differences  between  depart- 
ments covered by  more and less favorable public sector laws are 
relatively modest, consistent with the notion that there are sizeable 
spillovers of  wage  and employment decisions across department 
lines in a city. 101  The Effects of Public Sector Labor Laws 
Our analysis also raised questions about the magnitude of estimated 
effects of collective bargaining on wages, which is markedly  smaller 
in the department-based SOG data set than in the individual-based CPS 
data set for reasons that we were unable to determine. 
Notes 
I. We do not distinguish between various forms of interest arbitration such 
as conventional, issue-by-issue last-best-offer, or package last-best-offer. 
2. Some laws that outlaw strikes contain specific penalties while others allow 
courts to decide penalties.  As it is difficult  to determine which penalties are 
in practice more severe, we have not attempted to subdivide these laws further. 
3.  It is unclear whether strike permitted or compulsory arbitration  should 
be viewed as the most favorable category for collective bargaining.  In table 
3.1  we classified compulsory arbitration as most favorable, but none of our 
results depend on this choice. 
4. Equations (5) and (6) do not allow for supply or demand factors having 
different effects in cities with and without collective bargaining contracts. As 
these factors presumably  operate differently in  the two environments, one 
might expect them to have different coefficients, and in some of the empirical 
work we estimate separate equations for covered and uncovered cities to allow 
for this. 
5. For finance and control departments (for which there was no bargaining 
unit data) we used the data for clerical employee bargaining units. 
6. We  thank Jeffrey Zax for providing us with this data extract. 
7. Given the large samples that we are using it would have been expensive 
to do logit  or probit equations, with  little potential gain.  As the dependent 
variables have means well within the 0-1 interval in all samples, we are unlikely 
to run into serious functional form problems using the linear model. 
8. Use of full-time equivalent  employment yielded essentially identical results 
to those reported below. 
9. In fact, given the number of cities, we calculated city-specific means for 
all variables and performed regressions with the difference between a variable 
in a city and its mean, as in the within-city regressions in our table 3.3. 
10. Least squares estimates of equation (9) may still yield inconsistent pa- 
rameter estimates as the residual  uo is  negatively  correlated with  Yo. The 
coefficient on Yo will  be biased downward, biasing the coefficient on Lo as 
well.  While there is no simple correction for this bias unless one is willing to 
develop a much more complex model, calculations given in Freeman and Val- 
letta (1987) show it to be of negligible magnitude under plausible assumptions. 
1 1. Separate wage equations for departments in cities of different sizes showed 
the same pattern. In cities with populations over 500,000 the coverage effect 
is 0.00; in cities with populations between 250,000 and 500,000 it is 0.019; in 
cities with populations  between 50,000 and 250,000 it is 0.015; and in cities 
with populations less than 50,000, it is 0.071. 
12. The other local category differs between the data sets, as there are only 
three such groups in the SOG: sanitation, streets and highways, and finance 
and control, while the CPS contains a wider range of departments. 102  Richard B. FreemadRobert G.  Valletta 
13. The estimated coefficients (standard errors) for 1980 are: 0.21 (0.09) for 
state  employees; 0.19  (0.04) for  teachers;  and  0.22  (0.07) for other  local 
employees. The latter results are not strictly comparable to the 1984 regressions 
because prior to 1983 the other local group is confined to public administration 
employees. 
14. Freeman  (1986a) reports similar  inconsistencies  between  estimates of 
changes in union wage effects between CPS- and establishment-based surveys, 
while  Freeman (1985) reports  inconsistencies  between  estimates of  public/ 
private sector pay differentials between CPS- and establishment-based surveys 
of  federal  employees.  Hence, there is growing  evidence  of  inconsistencies 
between  wage differentials based on the CPS and those based  on other data 
sets. 
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Comment  Harvey S.  Rosen 
The paper by Freeman and Valletta is an econometric investigation of 
the ways in which different legal environments affect the outcomes of 
public  sector labor markets, where outcomes include:  1)  obtaining a 
contract, 2) levels of  unemployment, and 3) wages. 
Whatever the model eventually chosen, in order to estimate the effect 
of the “legal environment” one must be able to measure it. Freeman 
and Valletta  (F&V) devote section 3.1 of the paper to this issue.  In 
this paper, the legal environment encompasses the requirements for 
bargaining, the provisions for dispute resolution, and strike provisions. 
Within  each category,  F&V can order provisions  according to how 
much they constrain  the scope of public  sector union activity. They 
then rank all the possibilities along a single dimension. This hierarchy 
Harvey S. Rosen is  professor of  economics at Princeton  University,  and  research 
associate of  the National  Bureau of Economic Research. 104  Richard B. FreemadRobert G.  Valletta 
is described in their table 3.1. To turn this table into a number for each 
jurisdiction,  F&V  perform  a  Z-score  transformation  of  the  nine 
categories. 
An alternative strategy would have been to use a system of dichot- 
omous variables  to represent the nine categories.  There are over a 
thousand observations, so degrees of freedom would not be a problem. 
Tests on whether legal environment “matters” would then just be tests 
for the joint significance of the system of dummies. One advantage of 
such a procedure is that it would  yield quantitative estimates of the 
impacts of the various arrangements. The other advantage is that it is 
more familiar to most economists than Z-tests. 
F&V use two main sources of data for their analysis, the Current 
Population Survey and the Survey of Governments. The former is well 
known to labor economists, but a few words about the latter may be 
useful. The Survey of Governments is a rich source of data providing 
almost everything one would want to know about the components of 
jurisdictions’  budget constraints. The main problem that I  have  had 
using it arises because various legal jurisdictions can overlap geograph- 
ically. Consider, for example, a town which pays taxes to a “special 
district” whose responsibility is to provide education. The town’s pay- 
ments to the special district may be categorized as “intergovernmental 
grants,”  and the town’s education expenditures recorded as a zero! 
Unfortunately, the data set provides no obvious way  of determining 
whether such a situation is likely to be important for a given community. 
It does suggest, however, that some care should be taken in “cleaning” 
the data, and it would be nice to hear what steps were taken by F&V. 
(Perhaps such considerations  help explain the difficulties that F&V have 
in reconciling the results from the two sets of data.) 
F&V motivate  their estimating equation by  setting up a model  in 
which the maximand is the union’s objective function, which depends 
on the wage rate and employment. This is maximized  subject to the 
community’s demand curve for labor. The twist relative to more con- 
ventional models of wage-employment determination in unionized in- 
dustries is that the union can commit resources to shift out the demand 
curve for its services. On the other hand, it can also devote resources 
to raising its wages via collective bargaining; hence, another constraint 
in  the problem  is that total union resources must sum to some pre- 
specified amount. 
The equations actually estimated are the reduced form of this model. 
Thus, they estimate: 
W = awX  + bwC  + cwL + dwS + ewCxL, 
E  = UEX + bEc f CEL  + dEs + e&XL, 105  The Effects of Public Sector Labor Laws 
where E  = employment, X  = demand variables,  S  = labor supply 
variables, L  = F&V’s measure of the legal environment, and C  = a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether or not there is coverage by 
collective bargaining. The interaction variables are present to allow for 
the possibility of “threat effects.” 
I can think of another way in which the union might affect the eco- 
nomic environment. It might lobby the state and/or federal governments 
for grants. This suggests that it might be interesting to estimate a grants 
equation in addition to those for Wand E. It also suggests that treating 
grants as exogenous demand shifters may create econometric difficulties. 
It is important to note that the wage variable W does not take into 
account the accrued value of pensions.  In the current context, this 
point may be of importance for two reasons. First, local managers and 
politicians may find that the easiest way to deal with the demands of 
unions is to promise them more money in the future-when  someone 
else will be in charge. Although the evidence is mixed with respect to 
whether pension underfunding is correctly perceived  by current citi- 
zens (who might have to pay the price via capitalization), my guess is 
that this is an important consideration. This also suggests that some 
measure of  the likelihood  that current taxpayers will  also be future 
taxpayers might have a role in the model. (Perhaps this could be mea- 
sured by the proportion of the population that moves away from the 
community.) Second, if  pension practices were more or less uniform 
across communities, then this issue wouldn’t matter very much as a 
practical  matter.  However, Frant and Leonard (1984)’ provide  some 
estimates that there are large  cross-community  differences.  Indeed, 
different occupations within a community can be treated very differently. 
F&V’s choices for the X  and S variables seem altogether sensible. 
The only important omission is  the community’s tax price for local 
goods and services. In the median voter framework, this is determined 
in part by the property tax rate, the ratio of the median voter’s house 
value to community property values, and the median voter’s marginal 
federal income tax rate. Presumably, the lower the tax price, the greater 
the demand for local goods and  services, and hence the greater the 
demand for public  sector employees.  Some people have argued that 
local officials’ resistance to the elimination of deductibility is due to 
the fact that it would reduce public employment. Inclusion of such a 
variable  would help shed light on this  important issue. Whether the 
tax price is correlated with the C and L variables, and thus-would  affect 
their coefficients.  I do not know. 
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F&V estimate the equations using a variety of techniques, with al- 
ternative groups of right-hand-side variables. They make a rather strong 
case that their substantive results are robust. Among these results are 
that collective bargaining coverage raises wages and employment, which 
is consistent with the notion that public sector unions are able to shift 
out the demand for labor. However, while a more favorable legal en- 
vironment  leads to higher  wages,  it does not  have  much impact on 
employment in communities that are covered by collective bargaining. 
F&V explain this by arguing that the main effect of the favorable legal 
environment is  to strengthen the union’s  position  at the bargaining 
table, which increases its wage rate and moves it back along the demand 
curve. 
F&V’s essay joins the growing list of papers suggesting that political 
and legal institutions do matter in the analysis of  a community’s eco- 
nomic decisions. The paper will contribute to the debate on suitable 
ways to quantify such institutions and measure their impact. 